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SECTION ONE 
1. On July 22, 1981, an accident occurred in Rockbridge 
County, Virginia involving two automobiles. One car was driven 
by Al, who was alone at the time of the collision. The other car 
was driven by Bonnie and also contained a passenger, Chuck. All 
three persons were injured. 
On July 20, 1983, Chuck's attorney filed a motion for judg-
ment against both drivers, Bonnie and Al, in the Circuit Court of 
the County of Rockbridge to recover for the injuries which Chuck 
received in the adcident. Al was served with the motion for judg-
ment on July 22nd and Bonnie was served on July 23rd. 
Al's attorney filed a grounds of defense to the motion for 
judgment on July 30, 1983, and simultaneously filed a cross-claim 
against Bonnie, to recover for personal injuries sustained by Al 
in the collision. 
Bonnie's attorney filed grounds of defense to Chuck's motion· 
for judgment on Auqust 7, 1983, and filed at the same time pleas 
of the statute of.limitations to both the motion for judgment and 
the cross-claim. She alleged tha~ both actions against-her were 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
How should the Court rule on Bonnie's pleas of the statute 
of limitations? Why? 
* * * * * 
2. Charles is on trial for rape and robbery in the Circuit 
Court of Craig County, Virginia. During voir dire proceedings, a 
prospective juror, Herman, admits during lengthy questioning by 
defense attorneys that he has read and heard extensive news accounts 
of the;crimes of which the defendant is accused. When asked whether 
he has formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the de-
fendant, Herman answers: "I think it looks pretty bad for him. 
From all of the information that has been given in the papers, and 
it's gone through the Grand Jury, and I don't see how it would have 
gotten to this point if there wasn't some guilt there." On further 
questioning by the Court, Herman states that he understands that a 
man is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty, that he has not 
formed a fixed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Charles, and 
that the fact that Charles is charged with rape would not have any 
effect upon his ability to render a fair verdict. 
How should the Court rule on a challenge for cause to the 
seating of Herman as a juror? 
* * * * * 
SECTION ONE PAGE TWO 
3. You have been appointed by the Judge of the Circuit 
Court of the City of Roanoke, Virginia to defend John on charges 
of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony. John 
was apprehended by the police near the scene of the crime. He 
was taken to the police station where he was fully advised of his 
rights and signed a written confession. 
At the trial, the written confession was properly introduced 
into evidence by th~ Commonwealth's Attorney. John did not tes-
tify in his own behalf. 
In his closing argument to the jury, the Commonwealth's 
Attorney, Buzz Saw, refers to the written confession and then points 
out to the jury that John did not testify in his own defense. 
(a) What action, if any, do you take, and when? 
(b) What should the trial judge do? 
* * * * * 
4. Clem Hayseed, an attorney, represents Bristol Tractor 
Supply Corp., a Tennessee corporation, which has its only place of 
business in Bristol, Tennessee. Bristol Tractor .. Supply Corp. sold 
a tractor to Farmer Brown and delivered it to a farm which he owns 
and where he lives in Smyth County, Virginia. 
After using the tractor for a month, Farmer Brown goes to his 
attorney, John Longfellow, and advises him that the tractor does 
not perform satisfactorily and asks Longfellow to assist him in 
recovering $15,000.00 which he paid to Bristol Tractor Supply to 
apply toward the $30,000.00 purchase price. 
Bristol' Tractor Supply contends that Brown's problems are of 
his own making in that he is not properly operating the tractor, 
·and it expects Brown to pay the balance of the purchase price. 
Hayseed and Longfellow realize that the matter will not be 
resolved without litigation. 
(a) Which of the parties may bring an action in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia? 
(b) At a pretrial conference, the District Judge advises 
Hayseed and Longfellow of a local rule which requires all cases to 
be decided by six jurors. Is this rule permissible? 
(c) Hayseed and Longfellow request that the case be submitted 
to five jurors and advise the Court that they will accept a majority 
verdict. Is this permissible? 
* * * * * 
SECTION ONE PAGE THREE 
5. Ralph, who owns a 900 acre farm in Highland County, Vir-
g1n1a, conveys a five (5) acre parcel thereof to Jim. The deed 
described the parcel as bounded on the north by State Route 615, 
on the east and west by third parties, and on the south by a 15 
foot farm road, owned by Ralph, running from Ralph's barn out to 
Primary Highway 19 near the Oak Grove Middle School, whlch Jim's 
children attend. The deed makes no mention of Jim having any 
r i g h t to u s e t h e f a·r m r o a d . A ft e r J i m mo v e s i n to t h e n e w home h e 
built on the 5 acres, he decides to use the farm road to take his 
children to school rather than going the long way around on Route 
615. Ralph, in a fit of anger, closes the farm road by building 
a fence across it. 
Jim files suit in the Circuit Court for the purpose of estab-
1 ishing his right to use the farm road and to compel Ralph to re-
move the fence and reopen the farm road. 
Ralph responds that Jim has no interest in the farm road. 
He asserts that Jim has access to the public highway (State Route 
615), that he has no right to use the farm road, that it was re-
ferred to in the deed only for the purpose of describing the south-
ern boundary line of Jim's parcel of land, and that no easement 
over the farm road was granted to Jim in the deed. He also argues 
that the road is his property and if he had meant to give Jim an 
easement over it, he would have done so in the deed. 
Who is correct, Jim or Ralph? 
* * * * * 
6. Fred Friendly secured judgment against Norman Nuxall in 
1965 for $25,000.00, which he immediately docketed in the Office 
of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, Virginia. 
·on Joly 10, 1975, Nuxall sold his family farm lo~ated near Clay-
pool Hill in, Tazewell County to Ben Gorbus for fair market value 
by general warranty deed, which was duly recorded the same day 
in the aforesaid Clerk's Office. 
In 1984, shortly after the death of Nuxall, from whom Friendly 
had been unable to collect the debt after numerous attempts, Friendly 
demanded payment of his judgment, plus the interest and costs, from 
Gorbus, who promptly refused to pay. Friendly then filed a Bill of· 
Complaint in equity and a notice of li~ pendens, joining the proper 
parties, in the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, Virginia, seeking 
to enforce the lien of his judgment against the real estate Gorbus 
had bought from Nuxall. 
Gorbus c9mes to your office and retains you to represent him. 
You consider filing a plea of laches on the basis that this is a 
suit in equity. You also consider filing a plea of the statute of 
limitations. 
( a ) Would a plea of laches be sustained in this case? 
( b ) Would a plea of statute of limitations be-sustained in 
this case? 
* * * * * 
SECTION ONE PAGE FOUR 
7. Counsel for Walnut Lumber Company files a Bill of Com-
plaint in the Circuit Court of Bath County seeking an injunction 
against Solomon Osborne, a former salesman, who now works for a 
competitor and is dealing with many of Walnut's customers. He 
attaches to his complaint a written employment contract in which 
Osborne agreed that should his employment be terminated_for any 
reason, he would not seek employment with any competitor of Walnut 
within a twenty-five mile area of Walnut's place of business for a 
period of two years. 
Osborne answers the complaint and admits the contract and 
that he now works for a competitor within the restricted area. He 
alleges, however, that Walnut had no basis to terminate his employ-
ment and had requested that he resign. Reciting his need to sup-
port his family, Osborne further alleges that as a condition to his 
agreement to resign, Tom Pine, president of Walnut, agreed to waive 
the restrictive covenant in the employment contract and to permit 
Osborne to go back to work with the company where he started his 
career, notwithstanding the fact that such employment would be 
contrary to the provisions of the employment agreement upon which 
Walnut relies. It appears clear that the question whether there 
was an oral waiver as contended by Osborne will turn on the cred-
ibility of the expected testimony of Pine and Osborne. 
Along with his answer, Osborne's attorney files a written 
motion supported by an affidavit requesting that the matter in. con-
troversy be submitted to a jury. Walnut's counsel files a written 
reply to the motion in which he asserts that there is no basis for 
a jury trial in the cause. ~He asserts that equity practice in Vir-
ginia does not contemplate the use of lay jurors to determine mat-
ters which are properly for the Chancellor alone. He attaches to 
his reply the affidavit of Tom Pine who says that he told Osborne 
that approval of his future employment with a competitor within the 
two year period would require the vote of the board of directors, 
which never took place. 
The trial judge has turned to you as his law clerk and asks 
you whether under the facts recited, there should be a jury trial 
in this suit, and if so, would it determine the outcome? 
* * * * * 
8. Harvey Sturgill, a 98 year old widower and sometime land 
speculator, lived in the samll town of Raven, Virginia. He was 
eccentftc, but of sound mind. Having read about the earthquake 
situation in California, Sturgill became convinced that present 
Nevada desert land would soon become prime beachfront property. 
Ru s h i n g to ta k' e adv an ta g e o f th i s de a 1 , St u r g i 1 1 em p 1 o ye d James 
A. Tonto for $2,500.00 to go to Nevada and buy up as much desert 
as was available for $200,000.00. For convenience, Sturgill gave 
Tonto a signed blank check drawn on Sturgil1 's account at the 
"Bank of Raven" and a written power of attorney setting forth the 
SECTION UN!:. 1-'Al:it J-lVt:. 
purposes, terms and conditions of Tonto 1 s employment, including 
the power to fill in the check appropriately for a purchase. 
After Tonto left for Nevada, Sturgill died of old age. On 
the day after Sturgill 's death, but before Tonto learned of it, 
Tonto paid the sum of $200,000.00 for desert land using the check 
drawn o n S t u r g i l l 1 s a c co u n t . A 1 t h o u g h e v e r yo n e a t t h e · 11 .B a n k o f 
Raven" knew of Stur.gill 's demise, the Bank nonetheless honored 
the $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 . O 0 ch e·c k seven days after Stu r g i l 1 1 s death am i d many 
humorous comments about Sturgill 's foolhardy attempt to own prime 
beachfront property. 
Sturgill 's only daughter, Jezebel, is now attempting to void 
the purchase of the Nevada property and get the $200,000.00 back 
into Sturgill 's estate. In pursuing this quest, the following 
issues arise: 
(1) Did Tonto's actions in buying the Nevada property bind 
Sturgill's estate? 
(2) Did the "Bank of Raven" properly honor the $200,000.00 
check? 
How would you resolve these two issues? 
* * * * * 
9. John Quigly operated an automobile dealership in Hampton, 
Virginia. When he purchased cars from the manufacturer he paid for 
them with funds obtained under a line of credit with Convenient 
National Bank located in Hampton and put them on his lot for sale. 
For each car that he bought he would obtain a certificate of title 
from the Division of Motor Vehicles and the certificate would 
show a lien in favor of Convenient National Bank in the amount 
loaned on that car. When Quigly sold the car he would pay off the 
Bank and obtain a new certificate of tile for the purchaser who 
was not advised of Quigly's financing arrangements. This arrange-
ment was well understood by the Bank and worked very well for a 
number of years. 
During 1982, times were not the best in the automobile world 
and Quigly was struggling to survive. Accordingly, he was unus-
ually pleased to sell one of his top-of-the-line cars, fully loaded 
with conveniences, to Herman Hamilton. Hamilton paid cash for the 
car. Quigly gave him a receipt for his cash, a bill of sale, and 
had him fill in an application for title to be filed with the 
Division of Motor Vehicles. Quigly told Hamilton his title would 
be forwarded i.n about a week. Hamilton happily drove away. 
Quigly was pressed by other obligations and sent the money 
given him by Hamilton to Roger Realtor, his landlord, to bring 
his rent payments up to date. 
SECTION ONE PAGE SIX 
Within the next week, CoRvenient National Bank learned of 
the sale to Hamilton and ~ade demand on Quigly for the amount of 
its lien. When Quigly didn't make the payment, the Bank visited 
Hamilton and requested delivery of the car or payment of the 
Bank's lien. Hamilton refused to do either one, contending he 
had paid in full for the car and was entitled to keep it. The 
Bank explained that it had a duly recorded lien on the car and 
Hamilton was charged with notice of that lien and had to surrender 
the car. Who was ~orrect, Hamilton, or the Bank? 
* * * * * 
10. On April 3, 1979, Matilda filed a bill for divorce 
against her- husband Chesterfield in the Circuit Court of the City 
of Roanoke, Virginia on t~e grounds of cruelty .. After the Bill 
of Complaint was served Chesterfield and his attorney met with 
Matilda and her counsel, and the parties negotiated a Property 
Settlement and Support Agreement which was signed by Chesterfield 
and Matilda. Under the agreement Matilda received the family res-
idence and an automobile, and Chesterfield was obligated to pay her 
the sum of $1,500.00 per month in lieu of alimony. A final decree 
was entered on September 15, 1979 in which the Court granted a 
final divorce to Matilda, awarded her custody of their son, Michael, 
and ordered Chesterfield to pay Matilda the sum of $500.00 a month 
as support for Michael. The decree made ~o mention of support 
payments to Matilda, but it did approve the Property Settlement 
and Support Agreement in the following language: 
"Further Decreed, that the property settlement con-
tract or agreement made between the parties here~o 
on the 16th day of June, 1979, a copy of which agree-
ment is attached hereto, is hereby confirmed by this 
Court and is made a part of this decree, and the 
parties hereto shall hereafter have no property 
rights ~r interest in the property of each. other, 
real or personal, now held or hereafter acquired, 
or any rights or duties of support and maintenance, 
except as provided in the said property settlement 
agreement." 
During 1981 and 1982 Chesterfield's stock brokerage business 
encountered hard times and on October 10, 1982 he persuaded Matilda 
to accept the sum of $750.00 as her monthly support payment. These 
reduced payments continued for a year. In October of 1983 Matilda 
found herself strapped by the reduced income and asked Chesterfield 
to restore the original level of payments. She also asked him to 
increase the monthly payments for her son. In doing so she recited 
her own needs,, the fact that Mi cha el needed extensive dental work 
and contended that the cost of his education had increased sub-
stantially. 
SECTION ONE PAGE SEVEN 
Chesterfield refused to make any increased payments even 
though his business was then prospering, contending that Matilda 
had agreed to the reduction in the level of support payments and 
was bound by her acquiescence. Matilda then filed a petition 
in the chancery cause in which she had been granted a divorce, 
thus reopening that case, praying that Chesterfield be ordered 
to pay her all of the arrearage due under the court approv~d 
Agreement, that he~ spousal support be increased to $2,000.00. 
a month and that she be paid $1 ,000.00 a month for child support. 
She further prayed that Chesterfield be __ held in contempt for 
f~iling to keep up the spousal su~port payments in accordance 
with the original agreement. 
Assuming that Matilda made a strong showing of necessity 
in each ins~ance and demonstrated that th~ current vigor of 
Chesterfield's business enabled him to make such payments, how 
should the Court rule on: (a) the arreafages, (b) the request 
for spousal support, (c) the request for an increase in child 
support, and (d) the request to hold Chesterfield in contempt? 
